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Incentivicing doctors to take the costs of treatment into account in their prescription decision
could lead to lower health care expenditures and higher welfare. This paper shows that also the
opposite e￿ects can result. The reason is a misalignment of doctor and patient incentives: Because
of health insurance, the patient does not take the costs of treatment fully into account. This
misalignment hampers communication between patient and doctor, e.g. the patient may overstate
the intensity of symptoms. It is shown that cost incentives for doctors increase welfare if (i)
the doctor’s examination technology is su￿ciently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are
high enough. Optimal health care systems should implement di￿erent degrees of cost incentives
depending on type of disease and/or doctor.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that insurance creates moral hazard: In the health sector, insured people would like
to have more expensive treatments than socially optimal. On the other hand, treatments are normally
prescribed by doctors. If doctors took the costs of treatment into account in their treatment decision,
the moral hazard problem should disappear. The tradition in the medical profession, however, is to
view oneself as advocate of one’s patients. Consequently, the patient’s wellbeing is put ￿rst and costs
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1are only secondary. What is more, doctors are often explicitly hostile towards cost incentives in doctor
remuneration. The German chamber of doctors, for instance, writes in its principles of health policy 1
[...] the role of the doctor as advocate for his patient must not be restricted [...] The state
must not establish ￿nancial schemes (e.g. bonus-malus system) which could suggest to the
patient that materialistic, self-serving aspects are also of importance for medical decisions.
It is important to understand whether the doctors’ concerns are mainly self-interested, e.g. worries
about reputation and pay, or whether ￿nancial incentives for doctors could have a negative impact
on social welfare. Put di￿erently, can patient advocacy be interpreted as an e￿cient institutional
response to the particular structure of the health care market? Answering this question will also give
some insight into the optimal design of health care markets. In particular, in which parts of the health
care system should cost incentives for doctors be employed and where are cost incentives less likely to
succeed?
This paper focuses on the communication between patient and doctor. The patient’s input, e.g.
describing his symptoms and their intensity, is vital to reach the right diagnosis. 2 The main mechanism
I explore in this paper is the following: Patients are (fully) insured. If doctors take costs into account
in their treatment decision, their objectives and the objectives of their patients are no longer aligned. 3
Such a misalignment undermines the patient’s trust in his doctor which in turn a￿ects communication
negatively.4 More technically, in a setting where the patient has private information, e.g. about his
symptoms and their intensity, he has the possibility to exaggerate his symptoms (or their intensity)
in order to get a more expensive treatment. Of course, the doctor will anticipate such strategic
exaggerating. This anticipation gives the patient further incentives to exaggerate and so on. The
appropriate model to analyze such a ￿rat race￿ is the cheap talk framework. This paper will therefore
extend the canonical cheap talk model to the imperfect information setting typical for the health sector.
Although a complete breakdown of communication can be prevented, communication will be worse in
1Translation by the author. Original title and source: ￿Gesundheitspolitische Leits￿tze der ˜rzteschaft￿Ulmer
Papier￿ Beschluss des deutschen ˜rztetags 2008, Anlage 1, p. 6, http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/
UlmerPapierDAET111.pdf
2The importance of communication is also stressed in the aforementioned document of the German chamber of doctors
where it is stated that ￿health can neither be commanded nor produced since health depends crucially on the patient’s
collaboration.￿ Also there is a whole string of the medical literature dealing with doctor-patient communication, see
Stewart (1995) for a survey.
3Negative e￿ects from cost incentives on the doctor-patient relationship are also established in the medical literature,
see for example Rodwin (1995), Kao et al. (1998) or Gallagher and Levinson (2004).
4There is no doubt that patients understand this nexus: According to Gallagher et al. (2001) 73% of their respondents
dislike the idea of a cost control bonus for their doctor and 91% favor disclosure to the patient if such a bonus was in
place. Furthermore, 95% of those who dislike the bonus stated that the bonus would lower their trust in their physician.
2equilibrium because of the misalignment of interests, i.e. less information is transmitted from patient
to doctor. It is shown that this communication e￿ect can make a system without cost incentives
preferable from a social welfare point of view. If the patient’s collaboration is hardly needed, a system
with cost incentives is preferable. For example, a doctor can easily establish that a patient has a
broken leg by having an X-ray. The symptoms reported by the patient are less important in this case.
If, on the other hand, an illness might have a psychological background, the patient’s collaboration is
essential and a system without cost incentives might be preferable.
The main idea of the paper is a tradeo￿ between having the best information to base the decision on
and having the socially best decision rule. A related tradeo￿ is known in organization theory. Alonso
et al. (2008) ask how much autonomy division managers should have. Giving division managers more
autonomy results in better information use in decision making but less coordination across divisions. In
my paper, the only way to get better information (from the patient) is a socially less desirable decision
rule for the doctor. In both papers, there is a tradeo￿ between the quality of information and the
quality of the decision rule (for a given information structure). The downside of an informed decision
in Alonso et al. (2008) is a lack of coordination while in my paper it will be the neglect of costs. A
major technical di￿erence between the papers is that division managers (headquarters manager) have
full (no) information in Alonso et al. (2008) while doctor and patient will both receive a noisy signal
in my model. This setup seems to be closer to reality in the health sector.
From a technical point of view the paper contributes to the cheap talk literature following the
seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Their model is extended in de Barreda (2010) to a setup
where the decision maker receives a noisy signal. My paper generalizes further by substituting the
perfect information on the sender/expert/patient side by a noisy signal.
This paper complements existing literature on the design of health care systems. Early contribu-
tions as Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968) already point out the moral hazard caused by health insurance:
Insured patients might overconsume treatment from a social welfare perspective because they are in-
sured. Ma and McGuire (1997) introduce the physician as an additional player and analyze contractual
di￿culties in the health market. In particular, health outcome and doctor’s e￿ort are non-contractible
and even the quantity of care consumed can be subject to misreporting. Ma and McGuire (1997)
analyze how these contractual constraints in￿uence optimal contracts between insurance and patient
as well as between insurance and physician. My paper focuses on a di￿erent kind of constraint, i.e.
a constraint in information transmission arising in the communication between doctor and patient.
It will be shown that the necessity of information transmission between patient and doctor might
constrain the power of the incentive scheme o￿ered to the doctor.
3Obviously related is the literature on physician compensation and managed care. In his survey
Glied (2000) mentions two problems of ￿supply-side cost sharing,￿ i.e. cost incentives for physicians:
(i) underprovision of necessary services and (ii) strong incentives to avoid costly cases. In this context
my paper adds a third problem: Hampered information transmission between doctor and patient.
Furthermore, my paper provides one possible explanation for the ambiguous cost e￿ect of managed
care mentioned in Glied (2000).
The medical literature contains statements like ￿payment arrangements could signi￿cantly under-
mine patients’ beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents￿ (Mechanic and Schlesinger, 1996)
and emphasizes that there should be no con￿ict of interest between patient and doctor (Emanuel and
Dubler, 1995). Kao et al. (1998) ￿nd that patients trust their physician less if the physician is cap-
itated than when he is payed on a fee for service basis. Physicians are also less satis￿ed with their
relationships with capitated patients compared to their average patient (Kerr et al., 1997). My paper
contributes by formalizing why trust, interpreted as shared objectives, is vital for the patient-physician
relationship. Such a formalization is interesting for two reasons: First, it allows for both costs (less
trust) and bene￿ts (less overtreatment) of cost incentives. Second, one can obtain results concern-
ing the optimal design of health care systems, i.e. where in the health system are aligned interests
especially important and where could cost incentives improve welfare.
The next section introduces the model and is followed by a simple numerical example. This example
illustrates the main points. Section 4 analyzes a general model and answers the question: When do
cost incentives work? The ￿nal section concludes by discussing certain assumptions and pointing out
testable predictions as well as possible applications in di￿erent areas.
2. Formal setting
Patient and doctor have a common prior F over the set of all possible health states of the patient. The
set of health states is denoted by . A health state can be interpreted either as the severity of a given
disease or as a set containing di￿erent diseases. The patient receives a private signal p 2 p about
his health state. In practice this signal can be interpreted as the symptoms a patient can report to his
doctor or as the intensity of his symptoms. The doctor receives also a private signal d 2 d about
the patient’s health. This signal can be interpreted as the result of the doctor’s examination, e.g. his
interpretation of an X-ray photograph or listening to the patient’s heartbeat. Given the health state,
there is a distribution G(p;dj) of signals which is common knowledge. Put di￿erently, G(p;dj)
gives the probabilities that a patient (doctor) receives signal p (d) given a health state .
4The timing is the following: First, the patient’s health state is determined by nature. This health
state is unknown to doctor and patient. Second, doctor and patient receive their signals  = (p;d)
which correspond to the true health state through G. Third, the patient can send a message, e.g.
communicating his signal, to the doctor. Fourth, the doctor determines a treatment  from a set of
available treatments. The costs of the treatment c() are paid for by the patient’s insurance.
Utility of the patient depends only on his true health state  2  and the treatment . In
particular, a patient’s well being does in the end not depend on the signals. For the doctor, I look at
two scenarios: Either the doctor has ￿no cost incentives￿ which means that he makes his treatment
decision to maximize the patient’s utility or he is ￿cost sensitive￿ (or ￿has cost incentives￿) with which
I mean that he maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is the patient’s utility minus costs. The
perspective of the paper is therefore eventually the perspective of a (benevolent) designer of the health
system, e.g. a government or an insurance plan, who has to determine which kind of incentives he
gives to the doctor.
3. A simple example
This section deals with a small numerical example which illustrates that cost incentives can lead to
lower welfare. Take  = fA;B;Cg and p = d = f0;1g. In words, there are three diseases called
A, B and C. One can interpret health states either as similar illnesses or as levels of severity of the
same illness. Doctor and patient will each receive one of two possible signals which are denoted by
0 and 1. For example, the patient’s signal could be whether he feels ￿no/little pain￿ or ￿strong pain￿
while the doctor’s signal could be whether the patient’s heartbeat is unusual or not. The prior F is
given by disease A and B occurring with probability 2=5 each and disease C with probability 1=5. The
distribution G is given in the following table:
prior 2/5 2/5 1/5
 A B C
(0,0) 4/5 0 0
(0,1) 0 0 1
(1,0) 0 4/5 0
(1,1) 1/5 1/5 0
The interpretation is that, given health state A, signal (p;d) = (0;0) occurs with probability
4=5 and signal (p;d) = (1;1) occurs with probability 1=5. Assume that there are three available
5treatments which are denoted by a, b and c. The patient’s utility and the costs of each treatment are
given in the following table:
A B C costs
a 8 5 8 5
b 10 10 9 8
c 1 1 10 0
To illustrate: A patient with disease A receiving treatment a has a utility of 8. Treatment a costs
5. Therefore, welfare would be 8   5 = 3 in this situation.
One interpretation is that ￿disease￿ C is being healthy and treatment c is the option ￿no treat-
ment￿. Treatment b is a very e￿ective but also very expensive treatment while a is not so e￿ective but
substantially cheaper. A quick calculation shows that treatment a is welfare maximizing where welfare
is de￿ned by patient utility minus costs. The same is true for b in health state B and c in C.
3.1. No cost incentives
If the doctor has no cost incentives, the incentives of doctor and patient are aligned. The patient will
therefore communicate his true signal p in equilibrium.5 The doctor can then base his decision on
both signals and maximizes gross consumer surplus. Hence, the doctor knows the disease whenever
the signals are (0;0), (0;1) or (1;0). If the signal is (1;1), the doctor assigns equal probabilities to
disease A and B. This leads to the following optimal decisions: (0;0) ! b, (0;1) ! c, (1;0) ! b and
(1;1) ! b










(10   8) +
4
50
(10   8) +
4
50




3.2. Cost sensitive doctor
If the doctor is cost sensitive, his preferred decisions (if he knew both signals) would be: (0;0) ! a,
(0;1) ! c, (1;0) ! b and (1;1) ! b. Hence, there is a con￿ict between the patient and the doctor
whenever the signal is (0;0): The doctor prefers treatment a while the patient prefers b. Next, I write
down the optimal decision of the doctor if he only knows his own signal d. If d = 0, he assigns equal
5In principle, there is also a pooling equilibrium in which the doctor takes only his own signal into account and the
patient sends the same message regardless of his signal. However, this equilibrium is Pareto dominated and does not
seem very realistic.
6Just to illustrate: The ￿rst term is the probability of being in state A and receiving the signal (0;0), i.e. 2=5  4=5,
multiplied with the utility of the resulting treatment b in state A, i.e. 10, minus the costs of this treatment, i.e. 8.
6probability to disease A and B. Therefore, the optimal treatment is b. If d = 1, he assigns probability
2=9 to disease A, 2=9 to disease B and 5=9 to disease C. It is straightforward to calculate that in this
case the optimal treatment is c.
In principle, there could be two kinds of equilibrium: First, a separating equilibrium in which the
patient truthfully reports his signal to the doctor, i.e. the two signals are separated. Second, a pooling
equilibrium in which the patient sends the same message regardless of his signal.
Suppose there is a separating equilibrium, i.e. the patient communicates his signal p truthfully
to the doctor in equilibrium. The doctor will then implement the welfare maximizing treatment
knowing both signals. If p = 0, the patient expects￿given his signal￿to get a utility of utruth =
8=138+5=1310 = 114=13.7 If however the patient lied and communicated p = 1, the doctor would
implement treatment b and the patient’s expected utility would be ulie = 8=1310+5=139 = 125=13.
Hence, lying pays o￿ for the agent and there cannot be a separating equilibrium.





















Since Wc < Wnci, cost incentives reduce welfare in this example. Nevertheless, costs are lower if
the doctor is cost sensitive since the signal (1;1) leads to the low cost treatment c while b is prescribed
without cost incentives. The driving force behind this result are the con￿icting objectives of patient
and doctor which result in a break down of communication.
3.3. Variation I: Restricting the choice set
Interestingly, there is an easy ￿x in this example: Suppose, the health authority does not clear treatment
a. Hence, treatment a is not available. But then there is no con￿ict between doctor and patient as
even a cost sensitive doctor will now prescribe b if the signal (0;0) occurs. Unfortunately, this means
that cost incentives simply do not matter/work: Every signal leads to the same treatment with and
without cost incentives. Furthermore, this trick will not always work: Amend the example above with
a disease D which can be identi￿ed with certainty (so there would be a signal (2;2) which occurs if and
only if the health state is D). If in this state D treatment a is by far superior to all other treatments,
a health authority banning treatment a would reduce welfare.
7Given 
p = 0, the patient assigns probability 8=13 to health state A with signal  = (0;0) which leads to treatment
a. With the counter probability 5=13, he expects state C with signal  = (0;1) and treatment c.
73.4. Variation II: Increasing costs
The negative information e￿ect of cost incentives can be so strong that costs can be higher under cost
incentives. To see this, change the example above by changing the ex ante probability of disease C
from 1=5 to pc < 1=5 and assign the ex ante probability (1   pc)=2 to sickness A and B. Note that
this does not change decisions without cost incentives as it is always perfectly known whether one is
in state C or not.
If, however, pc is small enough and the doctor knows only his own signal, he will prescribe treatment
b instead of treatment c when he receives signal d = 1. This inevitably leads to higher costs than
without cost incentives: Now b is always prescribed while c was prescribed without cost incentives for
signal  = (0;1). Note that a lower pc will make the incentive constraint of a separating equilibrium
even tougher, i.e. reducing pc does not lead to a separating equilibrium. It turns out that in the
example expected costs are higher with cost incentives if pc < 2=41.
This result is slightly reminiscent of the empirical results concerning the cost e￿ects of managed
care. One feature of many managed care plans are cost incentives for doctors, e.g. capitation payment.
As Glied (2000) reports in his survey, results on the cost e￿ect of managed care are however inconclusive:
Some studies report higher costs, some report lower costs or no cost di￿erence between managed care
and traditional care plans.
4. Model and results
This section uses a more general model to analyze the setting and e￿ect described before. There are
two reasons why this is desirable: First, one has to verify that the e￿ects described above are not due
to the discrete nature of the example. Second, this will allow to determine under which circumstances
cost incentives are welfare maximizing and therefore have implications for the optimal design of a
health care system.
The patient’s message in the example above is ￿cheap talk￿: The message itself does not have direct
payo￿ implications. Only the treatment decision is relevant for the patient’s utility and welfare. The
canonical model for cheap talk games is Crawford and Sobel (1982). To ￿t the health sector, the
information structure of Crawford and Sobel (1982) has to be amended as described below.
I assume that health state  is a real number from some bounded interval and also p;d and  are
assumed to be real numbers.8 Without loss of generality take  = [0;1]. Again one can interpret the
8Restricting  to some interval, e.g. R+ is possible as explained in footnote 13. Drawing the signals from some closed
subset of R simpli￿es matters, see assumption 1.
8health state either as the severity of a given illness or one views  as a continuum of illnesses. Higher
signals are assumed to imply higher expected states. To make this formal de￿ne by H(jp;d) the
cumulative distribution function which gives the probability that the state is below  given signals p
and d. This distribution is derived from F() and G(p;dj) using Bayes’ rule. The assumption is
that H(jp;d) ￿rst order stochastically dominates H(jp0;d0) whenever d  d0 and p  p0. In
words, a higher signal implies that higher health states are more likely to occur.
Patient utility u( ) is a function of ￿distance￿ between health state and treatment. It is assumed
that the patient is fully insured, i.e. costs of treatment do not enter his utility function. Assume that
u(   ) is two times continuously di￿erentiable, strictly concave and attains its maximum at 0. Put
di￿erently, patient utility is maximized if  =  and is lower the further away treatment  is from
this ideal treatment. It is not assumed that u() is symmetric and therefore over- and undertreatment
might a￿ect utility in di￿erent ways. The cost function c() is strictly increasing and marginal costs
are bounded away from 0, i.e. c0()   8 for some  > 0. This last assumption implies that the
patient’s utility is never aligned with the social objective or, put di￿erently, the patient always prefers
a more expensive treatment than socially optimal because he is insured. If there was no such con￿ict,
cost incentives would simply not matter for the outcome. Consequently, introducing cost incentives
could not even help to reduce costs.
I use Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as solution concept. After observing his signal p a patient
updates his beliefs about his health state  and about the doctor’s signal. Given p, a strategy for
the patient is a probability distribution over p denoted by q(mjp).9 This distribution gives the
probability of reporting m 2 p when the true signal is p. For illustration purposes, think of a
partition equilibrium in which patients with signals in, say, [0:3;0:4] are bunched, i.e. send the same
message. In this case q(mjp) could be a uniform distribution over [0:3;0:4] for all p 2 [0:3;0:4].
Given his signal d and the message he receives from the patient, the doctor updates his beliefs about
the health state of the patient  and chooses his preferred treatment. For simplicity, I assume that
u(  ) c() is strictly concave in  which implies that there is a unique socially e￿cient treatment
w. This assumption is, for example, satis￿ed if c() is linear or convex. Hence, the doctor will always
have a unique preferred treatment which I denote by d(m;d). The strategies (q(mjp);d(m;d))
form an equilibrium if:
1. For each p, q(mjp) is a distribution, i.e.
R 1





d u(j   d(m;d)j)dP(;djp) where P(;djp) is the distribution of
(;d) derived from G(p;dj) and F() conditional on observing p and using Bayes’ rule.10
9For notational convenience q(mj
p) is a probability density function but mass points can be easily accommodated.
10Note that the patient takes expectations not only over the health state but also over the doctor’s signal because 
d
92. For each m and d treatment maximizes the doctor’s objective. For the cost sensitive doctor
this means that d(m;d) 2 argmax
R 1
0 [u(   )   c()]dH(jm;d) where with a slight abuse
of notation H(jm;d) is the distribution of the health state conditional on observing d and m
using by Bayes’ rule (given G(p;dj), F() and q(mjp)). Without cost incentives d(m;d) 2
argmax
R 1
0 u(   )dH(jm;d).
In words, the ￿rst condition says that the patient reports with positive probability only signals max-
imizing his utility given the strategy of the doctor. The second condition establishes that the doctor
uses an optimal strategy given the patient’s equilibrium behavior.
For the analysis of this model the following technical assumption proves to be useful. Note that
the boundedness part is automatically satis￿ed if Hp is continuous and the signal  is drawn from a
closed set, i.e. if p and d are closed intervals.
Assumption 1. H(jp;d) is di￿erentiable in p and jHp(jp;d)j is bounded from above by some
M > 0. At all states where H(jp;d) has a density h(jp;d), this density is also di￿erentiable in
p and hp is bounded.
Put di￿erently, beliefs about the true health state do not change too sharply if the patient’s signal
changes marginally. Note that slightly irregular distribution, e.g. with mass points at a ￿healthy state￿
 = 0, can be allowed. Assumption 1 simpli￿es the analysis by ensuring that the doctor’s treatment
decision is di￿erentiable in the patient’s signal.
The game is then similar to the information transmission model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) with
three additional twists: First, the doctor (receiver in the language of Crawford and Sobel) receives
a signal while he is completely ignorant in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Second, the patient (sender)
does not know the state of the world. Instead he has a noisy signal. Third, the divergence of interests
between doctor (receiver) and patient (sender) is not ￿xed but depends on the treatment (decision).
The following proposition extends results from Crawford and Sobel (1982) to this more general setting.
Proposition 1. With cost incentives, there exists no separating equilibrium. There exist partitioning
equilibria on the range of p. Each part of this partition has a minimum length  which is bounded
away from zero. If p is bounded, the number of parts in the partition is bounded from above.
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is the following: In equilibrium a patient cannot tell his true signal to the doctor.
If he did, the doctor would prescribe a treatment that is ￿too cheap￿ from the patient’s point of view
(as he does not care about costs). Hence, the patient would have an incentive to overstate his signal.
will in￿uence the doctor’s treatment decision.
10In practice, this would mean to claim additional symptoms or to overstate the intensity of existing
symptoms. What happens in equilibrium is that the patient’s signal range is partitioned and the patient
reports in which part of the partition his signal lies. The doctor does not know the precise signal of the
patient but gets a rough idea which he takes into consideration when choosing the treatment. Because
of the partitioning, a patient can no longer overstate his signal ￿a little bit￿. If the patient deviated by
reporting a higher part of the partition, he would get a substantially higher treatment. In equilibrium
he will not deviate because he expects this treatment to be too high. In practice one could interpret
this in the following two ways: First, a patient does not want to report symptoms that are too much
di￿erent from the real ones as this could mislead the doctor, i.e. result in treating the wrong illness.
Second, extreme overstatement of symptoms could result in too strong medication with severe side
e￿ects. Hence, the patient does not want to overstate his existing symptoms too much.
It is also clear that the partition cannot be arbitrarily ￿ne: If the parts are too small, then over-
stating one’s signal ￿a little bit￿ is again possible. This explains the minimum length statement in the
proposition. The minimum part length immediately implies that the number of parts is bounded if
the interval from which patient signals are drawn is bounded.
The mechanism through which cost incentives can harm welfare is the same as in the example
of section 3: If the objectives of doctor and patient are di￿erent, the patient has an incentive to
use his information strategically to get the more expensive treatment he wants. In equilibrium, the
doctor will have less information (partitioning of signal range) compared to the situation without cost
incentives. Consequently, he is more prone to make inappropriate treatment decisions. In short, there
are two e￿ects when introducing cost incentives: First, costs are taken into account which, ceteris
paribus, decreases costs and increases welfare. Put di￿erently, the doctor stops prescribing excessively
expensive treatments. Second, communication and therefore the information of the doctor is worse.
Hence, treatment decisions are less accurate which reduces welfare. Whether the cost or the information
e￿ect dominates is ex ante unclear. The following propositions show that in two extreme cases the
cost e￿ect dominates and therefore cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives.
Proposition 2. Welfare is higher with cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is su￿ciently informative.
That is, given G(p;dj), there exists an " > 0 such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare
than no cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is drawn from "G(p;dj) + (1   ")1 where 1 is a
distribution putting all probability mass on . Cost incentives lead also to higher welfare if the patient’s
signal is su￿ciently uninformative, i.e. for " > 0 small enough if the patient’s signal is drawn from
"G(p;dj) + (1   ")U where U is the uniform distribution over [0;1].
Proof. see appendix
11This result is intuitive: If the doctor is able to determine the patient’s health state almost on his
own, i.e. without knowing the patient’s signal, then the patient’s signal is useless. Therefore, the
information e￿ect of introducing cost incentives is small while the cost e￿ect is still there.
One interpretation of proposition 2 is that cost incentives become eventually more attractive with
medical progress. This holds at least true if medical progress implies better diagnosis possibilities
for doctors. Consequently, one might then expect to see more cost incentive elements in health care
systems over time.
A second interpretation is that some specialists optimally should have cost incentives while others
should not. A radiologist or a trauma surgeon will normally base his decisions on his own examination
and less on the patient’s report.11 This might be less true for an internist or a general practitioner.
A related third interpretation is that an optimal health care system should incorporate selective
cost incentives. More precisely, cost incentives should be applied for the treatment of diseases where
the doctor’s information is relatively more important than the patient’s information.
Proposition 3. Cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if social and private
objectives di￿er su￿ciently. That is, for any given information structure and cost function c() there
exists an  > 0 such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost
function c().
Proof. see appendix
The intuition is that the cost e￿ect will become dominant if (marginal) costs are high enough.
Consequently, the information loss due to cost incentives is negligible compared to the cost e￿ect.
In line with previous interpretations cost incentives are especially useful for specialists dealing with
high cost treatments on a regular basis. Also diseases involving high cost treatment on a regular basis
are especially well suited for cost incentives.
The previous propositions illustrate when cost incentives are superior to no cost incentives. To
conclude this section, I want to give an example where no cost incentives are superior to cost incentives.
In fact, I can use the same example as Crawford and Sobel (1982) which is attractive for two reasons:
First, it is very simple and allows therefore for an analytical solution. Second, it has been used
repeatedly in the cheap talk literature and has become a benchmark example there.
Example. Health states are uniformly distributed on [0;1]. The patient has perfect knowledge of the
health state while the doctor’s signal is completely uninformative. Assume that the patient’s utility
function is a quadratic loss function, i.e. u(;) =  (   )2, and that the cost function is linear in
11Another example of this category is the veterinarian or to quote Will Rogers: ￿The best doctor in the world is the
veterinarian. He can’t ask his patients what is the matter-he’s got to just know.￿
12treatment, i.e. c() = . Given the information that p (which is now the true health state) is in the
interval (s1;s2), the optimal treatment decision for a doctor with cost incentives is  = s1+s2 
2 . With
 = 1=10 the model is mathematically equivalent to the example in Crawford and Sobel (1982). It is
shown there that the ￿nest possible equilibrium partition is (0;2=15;7=15;1), i.e. a patient will report
whether his signal is in [0;2=15) or in [2=15;7=15) or in [7=15;1]. Utility of a patient with state  in
[0;2=15) is given by  (1=60   )2, with  2 (2=15;7=15) utility is  (1=4   )2 and with  2 (7=15;1)


















































Hence expected welfare is  0:01058   0:045 =  0:05558. Note that this is an upper bound on welfare:
Of course, there are also equilibria with partitions consisting of only two parts or one part. It is easy
to check that these equilibria result in lower welfare.
Without cost incentives the patient will truthfully reveal his signal and therefore communicate the
true health state to the doctor. Consequently,  =  and consumer welfare is 0. Expected costs are
1
100:5 = 0:05 which results in expected welfare of  0:05. Therefore, no cost incentives lead to higher
welfare than cost incentives.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Introducing cost incentives for doctors turns out to be a double edged sword: On the one hand, taking
costs into consideration should avoid the prescription of too expensive treatments. On the other hand,
misalignment of patient’s and doctor’s incentives will hamper communication between the two: The
patient has an incentive to exaggerate and in equilibrium this leads to signal bunching. Consequently,
the doctor has worse information and is less likely to assess the patient’s health state correctly. Knowing
about the uncertainty he might even choose more expensive treatments to be on the safe side. In a
numerical example, this can lead to higher costs than under no cost incentives (see section 3).
If costs are very high or if the doctor is able to assess the health state very accurately given only his
signal, cost incentives are the welfare maximizing policy. This shows that an optimal health care system
will use di￿erent degrees of cost incentives in di￿erent circumstances. In practice, cost incentives could
di￿er across diseases and across specialists.
Although the model is stylized, it allows to formalize the idea that trust is important in the patient-
13doctor relationship. A lack of trust reduces the quality of communication and eventually the quality
of the doctor’s diagnosis. This e￿ect could constrain contracting between insurances and doctors.
Note that some seemingly strong assumptions are actually not very restrictive: The concentration
on two extreme cases where the doctor either maximizes patient utility or total welfare is obviously
not realistic. The main e￿ect, that diverging objectives lead to worse communication, however, holds
true whenever the doctor cares more about costs than the patient. By the same argument, it is not
restrictive to assume full indemnity insurance: The main point is that the patient does not bear the
full social costs which is a feature of any form of insurance. The results do therefore not depend on a
speci￿c form of insurance. One can interpret the costs c() simply as the part of treatment costs paid
by the patient’s health insurance.
In some sense, the model is a best case scenario for the benevolent designer: He can freely set the
doctor’s incentives without incurring any costs. In practice setting up an incentive scheme for doctors
might actually be costly. Doctors might also not respond immediately because of previously formed
habits. It is therefore even more remarkable that the designer might not want to give cost incentives
to the doctor.
The model gives several testable predictions. Quality of diagnosis should decrease after an intro-
duction of cost incentives for doctors. Such a quality decrease could be re￿ected in the data in di￿erent
ways: First, therapies could be changed more often (if the doctor realizes the error at a later stage).
Second, patients with a given diagnosis-treatment pair will be treated less successfully (e.g. take longer
to recover) because some receive the wrong treatment due to a wrong diagnosis. These e￿ects should
be more pronounced for specialists and diseases where patient input is vital for the diagnosis. If trust
re￿ects the willingness to communicate, one should expect patient’s trust in their doctor to be lower
when their doctor has cost incentives. This last result is indeed con￿rmed by the health literature, see
for example Kao et al. (1998).
More abstract, a welfare maximizing sponsor (say a benevolent government) might prefer a decision
maker (doctor) who shares his preferences not with the sponsor but with the patient. In a broader
context an agent might bene￿t from surrendering his interests when information provision by another
party is important. This could have applications in other contexts like mediation: A mediator with
decision power who shares the interests of another party might be preferable to making the decision
oneself.
In general, shared objectives proof to be vital for information provision. Patient advocacy can
therefore be seen as an institutional response to the importance of information provision by patients.
Consequently, one might expect similar institutions to emerge whenever information provision by
14a￿ected parties is vital. In this context, the relationship between a lawyer and his client could serve
as an additional example.
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17Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: The proof proceeds in a number of steps. The ￿rst three steps establish
that there cannot be a separating equilibrium, i.e. there is no equilibrium in which a patient always
reports his true signal. Consequently, patients with some signals are bunched together. Patients in one
￿bunch￿ (one part of a partition of the signal range) send the same report to the doctor. Steps four
and ￿ve establish that each part of a partition must have minimum length, i.e. the partition cannot
be arbitrarily ￿ne.





0 u(   )dH(jm;d) for a given equilibrium strategy q(mjp); i.e. the patient would
opt for an at least b higher treatment than a cost sensitive doctor if he chose (and had the same
information). This follows from the ￿rst order conditions corresponding to the two argmax expressions
Z 1
0







Since the left hand side is strictly decreasing in  and c0()   the claim follows as u0() is continuous.
Therefore, the left hand side of (3) is continuous in  and also strictly decreasing in . This argument
is for a given (m;d) but the in￿mum of all these b over (m;d) will also be strictly positive. To
establish this, it is su￿cient to show that the derivative of the left hand side of (3) with respect to 
is bounded:12 Since u0(   x) > 0 for x  1 and any  2 [0;1], the optimal treatment is bounded from
above by 1. Furthermore, the optimal treatment is bounded from below by  solving u0( ) = c0(),
i.e. the optimal treatment if the doctor knew that  = 0. Therefore  1       1   . By the
continuity of u00() and the compactness of [ 1;1 ], u00() is bounded on this interval. Consequently,
the derivative of the left hand side of (3) is a weighted (by the distribution H()) average of a bounded
function and therefore bounded. Denote by B > 0 such a bound on the derivative of the left hand side
of (3). Then we can choose b = =B.13
Second, the patient’s expected utility is under separating higher under a slightly higher decision
than the cost sensitive doctor takes. From the ￿rst step and the strict concavity of u() it follows that
any treatment in (d;d + b) yields a higher expected utility for the patient than d.
12Just to illustrate why boundedness is su￿cient: Say the derivative of the left hand side of (3) is between 0 and  B.
Since this left hand side is di￿erentiable, the two  solving (3) with the right hand side equal to zero and equal to c
0()
have to di￿er by at least =B.
13If the treatment is restricted to be larger than, say, 0, the argument still holds true as long as H(0j0;0) < 1. A
patient will then always desire a treatment that is strictly bounded away from 0. Therefore, interests of patient and
doctor are not aligned even if the constraint   0 is binding.
18Third, in a hypothetical separating equilibrium the patient attains a higher utility by misrepresent-
ing slightly upwards as the doctor will increase his decision uniformly continuously in p. The implicit









0 [u00(   )   c00()]dH(jp;d)
: (4)
The denominator is obviously positive as it is ( 1) times the second order condition of the doctor’s
maximization problem. The numerator is positive as well because of stochastic dominance: As  u0( 





H1() ￿rst order stochastically dominates H2(). Since H(jp0;d) ￿rst order stochastically dominates
H(jp;d) whenever p0 > p, the numerator has to be positive. The uniform continuity follows from
the boundedness of 4: The numerator is bounded by assumption 1 and the fact that u0( ) is bounded
on the relevant range. The strict concavity of the doctor’s program implies that the denominator is
strictly bounded away from zero.14 By uniform continuity, misrepresentation can be chosen small
enough to prevent an ￿overreaction￿ by the doctor.
Consequently, there cannot be a separating equilibrium. The same argument shows that also locally,
i.e. on some subinterval of the patient’s signal range, there cannot be a perfect separation of types,
i.e. patient signals have to be bunched in equilibrium.
Fourth, in a partition equilibrium communicating a higher partition will result in a higher treatment
decision. This follows from the fact that higher signals p indicate higher health states  and the





2  s1 < s2.
Fifth, in a partition equilibrium there exists a minimum partition length  > 0. It was shown
earlier that the optimal treatment decision of a doctor is uniform continuous in p (in a hypothetical
separating equilibrium). Therefore, there exists a  > 0 such that optimal treatment decisions di￿er
by less than b for all p and p0 with jp   p0j <  (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Now
suppose by way of contradiction that there was a partition (s0;s1) with s1  s0 < . By the de￿nition
of  and b, a patient with signal p = s0 will (in expectation) strictly prefer the cost sensitive doctor’s
separating treatment decision for type p = s1 to the separating treatment decision for type p = s0.
By concavity of u(), he will also prefer a cost sensitive doctor’s separating treatment decision for all
types p 2 (s0;s1) to his own. By continuity, the same holds for patients with a signal s0   " for
some " > 0 small enough. Clearly, a cost sensitive doctor receiving the message (s0;s1) will assign a
14To be precise, this follows as the treatment range is bounded by  and 1. On this closed and bounded treatment
range the maximum of the second derivative exists and constitutes the bound away from 0.
19treatment between the optimal separating treatment for p = s0 and for p = s1. Therefore, a patient
with signal s0   " will prefer the message (s0;s1) to any message m  [0;s0].
Step ￿ve and the boundedness of the patient’s signal range imply that the number of partitions in
any partition equilibrium is bounded.
A one-part-partition equilibrium (￿babbling equilibrium￿) in which all p are pooled exists always.
This proves existence of partition equilibria.
Proof of proposition 2: Denote the doctor’s beliefs over states  (derived by Bayes’ rule) given
a signal drawn from "G(p;dj) + (1   ")1 by k(;"jd). Note that these beliefs are continuous in
". For " = 0, the doctor has full information and therefore the welfare maximum is attained with cost
incentives. As c0() > 0, decisions under no cost incentives di￿er from decisions with cost incentives.
Consequently, welfare with cost incentives is strictly higher than without cost incentives if " = 0.
As beliefs (and therefore treatment decisions and welfare) are continuous in ", the ￿rst part of the
proposition follows.
For the second part, note that H(jp;d) does not depend on p if " = 0. Consequently, no
information is lost when switching to cost incentives. Taking costs into account makes cost incentives
strictly superior as c0() > 0. By continuity of H(jp;d) in ", the same conclusion holds for " > 0
small enough.
Proof of proposition 3: Since c0()   > 0, there exists an  such that
 u0(1)   c0(0)  0:
This implies that the welfare maximizing treatment decision  is non-positive for any signal/message
under the cost function c(). Without cost incentives   0 and (p;d) > 0 with strictly positive
probability as Z 1
0
 u0()dH(jp;d) > 0
whenever H(0jp;d) < 1. Consequently, welfare is lower without cost incentives compared to the
simple policy  = 0 (regardless of the signal) under cost function c(). A cost sensitive doctor will
improve on this simple policy by using the information he has, i.e. d. Consequently, cost incentives
lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost function c().
20